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People are embedded in social interaction that shapes their brains throughout lifetime. Instead of emerging
from lower-level cognitive functions, social interaction could be the default mode via which humans commu-
nicate with their environment. Should this hypothesis be true, it would have profound implications on howwe
think about brain functions and howwe dissect and simulate them.We suggest that the research on the brain
basis of social cognition and interaction should move from passive spectator science to studies including
engaged participants and simultaneous recordings from the brains of the interacting persons.People among People
The importance of interacting with other people is evident for hu-
man cognition, development, and well-being but has only
recently started to gain attention in experimental neuroscience.
The reasons for the earlier ignorance are obvious: human-to-
human interactions are extremely complex, especially because
the interaction unfolds in time with an unpredictable trajectory,
and it is challenging to analyze and interpret brain-imaging
data collected within the diverse and ever-changing social set-
tings. It is also clear that ‘‘person stimuli,’’ including dynamic
faces and bodies, do not only comprise a large set of complex
sensory features, but our interpretations of them go far beyond
the immediate information given.
The importance of social interaction is evident in our everyday
life: we teach, learn, converse, treat, and deceive. We are
shaped by other people and crave for social contacts to the
extent that isolation is used as punishment and even as torture.
According to a recent meta-analysis, social isolation and loneli-
ness are risk factors for increased mortality (Holt-Lunstad et al.,
2015).
We often feel sad or happy with others. However, it is difficult
to define to which extent such concurrent emotions result from
direct contagion. In fact, one person’s emotions can elicit oppo-
site feelings in the other, for example, when an aggressive per-
son frightens a peaceful bystander on the street. On the other
hand, mother-infant dyads, which often show clear synchrony
of emotional states, may reflect emotional regulation rather
than sharing of the same emotional state.
During social interaction, people receive both conscious and
unconscious social cues from others’ expressions, gestures,
postures, actions, and intonation. Thus, they automatically align
at many levels, starting from bodily synchrony to similar orienta-
tions of interests and attention. Such an alignment facilitates pre-
diction and understanding of the others’ aims and future actions.
A good example of automatic alignment is the smooth turn-tak-
ing during conversation: over different languages and cultures,
the gaps between the turns are typically only up to a few hundred
milliseconds, and the speech turns may even overlap (Stivers
et al., 2009). So brief intervals cannot reflect just reactions to
the end of the previous speaker’s utterances; instead, the con-versation participants have to be aligned to predict when the pre-
vious speaker is going to finish her turn of talk.
Although verbal communication is often emphasized in the
analysis of social interaction, a major part of human-to-human
interaction is nonverbal, including exchanges of glances, frowns,
and prosody. In contrast to this kind of clearly embodied interac-
tion, disembodied communication commonly takes place in the
modern society via various technical tools; still many people
consider it necessary to augment their written messages with
emotional icons stemming from embodied interaction.
Attending and Neglecting Others
Even when we cannot identify other people, we easily categorize
them on the basis of external factors, such as profession,
clothing, or the way they speak. During social encounters, these
features—in addition to, e.g., gender, seniority, professional de-
gree, or expertise—determine the interaction order, often in a
culture-dependent manner.
To some people, we do not pay any attention; they just co-
exist without havingmuch effect on us. Naturally, such a different
allocation of attention affects the obtained information and the
possibilities to understand the intentions and behavior of others.
Moreover, sensory defects and brain disorders put people to
different footings as the sensory data on which they base their
understanding of the world are distorted (Kennedy and Adolphs,
2012).
Sociologist Erving Goffman accurately described how
behavior in public places is governed by institutionalized norms
and rules (Goffman, 1966). If people need to cut in line at an
airport because they need to catch their plane, they may ask
for privilege and are usually granted for that. But to behave in
an acceptablemanner, they are expected to apologize and thank
for the favor. Many of these unwritten rules obviously help to
keep the society in a good order, and for the same reason people
are eager to punish misbehaving individuals, even those who
they do not know and will never meet again. On the other
hand, help is offered even to strangers from whom no corre-
sponding favor can be expected. This kind of cognitively
demanding ‘‘indirect reciprocity’’ may have been central in the
evolution of human societies, functioning via reputation buildingNeuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 181
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(Nowak and Sigmund, 2005).
During a smooth social encounter involving two or more peo-
ple, the interaction is dynamic and bilateral: partners notice each
other and are mutually regulating and co-adapting their own
behavior. Leader–follower relationships easily emerge during
the interaction but with dynamical and unpredictable changes
of the lags between the participants. For example, when musi-
cians play in small ensembles, they show different levels of
mutual adjustments in tempo to synchronize tone onsets (Badino
et al., 2014; Wing et al., 2014); such corrections are based on
auditory feedback but also on monitoring the movements of
the other players.
Behavioral synchrony is the natural key in various group
performances in music and sports: without too much effort the
participants mutually adapt to the rhythm of others’ movements
(Coey et al., 2012; Richardson et al., 2007) and even to the
speech rhythm. In the latter case, in the absence of any
instructions to synchronize, the entrainment can be of similar
strength as in typical finger-tapping tasks where the partici-
pants are specifically instructed to synchronize their behavior,
implying that speech automatically and strongly entrains
the participants (Himberg et al., 2015), in agreement with the
astonishing easiness of conversation (Garrod and Pickering,
2004).
Self versus Others
Although healthy adults typically have no difficulties in discrimi-
nating themselves from others, the concept of self is multifac-
eted and hierarchical. Charles H. Cooley described already in
1902 humans as looking-glass selves who know themselves as
reflections from the other people (Cooley, 1998). Similarly, a
recent treatise on the concept of self made a distinction between
‘‘me’’ and ‘‘I.’’ Here, ‘‘me’’ refers to how I am seen, or I think that I
am seen by others, involving both affective and cognitive self-
related brain processing, whereas ‘‘I’’ is a coherent self that re-
sults from multisensory integration of an embodied actor with
continuous contact with the surrounding world (Christoff et al.,
2011).
Other people may sometimes know better than we ourselves
how we would react in a new situation (Gilbert et al., 2009).
Yet, we generally think that we know much more about others
than those others can know, by means of similar observation
of behavior, about us; this phenomenon is known as the illusion
of asymmetric insight (Pronin, 2008; Pronin et al., 2001). The self-
perception theory (Bem, 1967), although much criticized, even
states that people learn about themselves by observing their
own actions similarly as they observe others.
Already a young baby expects interaction from others, getting
nervous very soon if the mother ‘‘freezes’’ her face. Such ‘‘still-
face’’ experiments suggest that the baby has from early on
communicative intentions and that she and the caretaker form
an interactive system that is mutually regulated (Sravish et al.,
2013). Accordingly, children with Moebius syndrome, congenital
bilateral facial nerve paralysis, experience difficulties in social
interaction as the caregivers cannot respond properly to the
child’s emotions because the expressions of emotions are not
visible on such a face (Cole and Spalding, 2009). Although we182 Neuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.do not (fortunately) have data of people who would have devel-
oped without any human contact, impoverished interaction
and social deprivation, e.g., in orphanages, has been reported
to lead to behavioral disabilities (Rutter et al., 1999).
Private Brains, Shared World
Wehumans have private brains but share theworld,more sowith
people close to us. It is thus a nontrivial question how we, with
our own brains that differ extensively in their detail, can under-
stand each other. Such mutual understanding requires a be-
tween-participant similarity in variousmechanisms of perception
and action (Hari et al., 2013). It is already known that in some
brain areas activity can ‘‘tune in’’ in subjects receiving similar
sensory-affective stimulation, e.g., during listening to a spoken
narrative (Stephens et al., 2010) or while watching professionally
directed movies that effectively engage the viewers (Hasson
et al., 2004, 2008; Ja¨a¨skela¨inen et al., 2008; Malinen and Hari,
2011; Nummenmaa et al., 2012). Movie episodes eliciting
emotions—especially negative ones such as fear—are particu-
larly effective in increasing ‘‘collective ticking,’’ evident as
across-spectators synchronization of wide brain areas (Num-
menmaa et al., 2012, 2014b). Moreover, people consistently
report similar bodily feelings during viewing of emotionally laden
movie clips, which emphasizes the seamless integration of body
in emotions, as well as the synchronization of both brain and
bodily functions across people embedded in an absorbing social
situation (Nummenmaa et al., 2014a).
The ‘‘social brain hypothesis,’’ put forward by Robin Dunbar,
suggests that the computational demands of living in social
groups have driven the evolution of the large human brain. In
such groups, one constantly needs to monitor others and to
anticipate their future actions. It is thus the complexity of social
relationships and the group size rather than social learning or
general intelligence that are considered decisive for develop-
ment of the human brain (Dunbar and Shultz, 2007; Dunbar,
1998). Importantly, sociality is a group property rather than just
an individual personality trait.
Neural Substrates of Reading Other Minds
Recent flourishing of social neuroscience has considerably
enlarged and deepened our understanding about social stimuli,
tasks, and contexts that affect human brain function. Especially
revolutionary has been the research on mirroring systems, start-
ing with the discovery of (motor) mirror neurons in the monkey
frontal cortex (di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Rizzolatti and Craighero,
2004). These studies have brought together various disciplines
focusing on human cognition.
Basically, two different mechanisms, mirroring and mentaliz-
ing or theory of mind (Frith, 2007; Frith and Frith, 2012), have
been proposed to support ‘‘reading’’ of other minds. Instead of
being competitive or mutually exclusive, as they are often
considered, these two mechanisms likely work together in a
complementary fashion but with different temporal scales, as
is typical for many dual cognitive processes that comprise im-
plicit and explicit components (Bohl and van den Bos, 2012).
Mirroring is fast, implicit, automatic, and intuitive, and it is
considered to contribute at subconscious level to the under-
standing of other person’s intentions or goals. According to
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from human visual to motor cortex during action observations
are of the order of 250 ms (Nishitani and Hari, 2000; Nishitani
and Hari, 2002), in line with a fast mirroring route. In contrast,
mentalizing—referring to the ability to attribute mental states to
others and to believe that they have their own beliefs about the
world—is explicit, controlled, conscious, and reflective, and
therefore slower than mirroring. Although the exact time courses
of mentalizing still remain to be specified, a recent electroen-
cephalographic (EEG) study of the neural time courses of brain
processes supporting empathy and sympathy implied that acti-
vation of thementalizing network is lagging themirroring network
by 200–300 ms (Thirioux et al., 2014). Because the mirroring and
mentalizing brain circuitries overlap only in part (Spengler et al.,
2009), they can operate in parallel, and even independently
although they usually participate in the same tasks. One
assumption is that mirroring provides data for further processing
in the mentalization network.
The main circuitry of motor mirroring, also called the action-
perception network, comprises the premotor areas in the inferior
frontal cortex and a dense frontoparietal network combining vi-
sual, somatosensory, and motor processing; the system also
has close connections to limbic areas (Rizzolatti and Craighero,
2004).Whether the primarymotor cortex also belongs to the core
of the mirror-neuron system is still under debate (Hari et al.,
2014).
Functional brain imaging studies in humans have identified
cortical regions involved in different social tasks, such as the
engagement of the fusiform face area (FFA) in face perception
(Kanwisher et al., 1997) and the temporoparietal junction (TPJ)
in mentalizing tasks (Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003). In general, a
network of brain regions involved in, e.g., seeing a face engages,
in addition to FFA, also the occipital face area (Gauthier et al.,
2000) that is associated with face-feature processing (Henriks-
son et al., 2015), regions in the anterior temporal lobe that pro-
cess the identity of the face (Kriegeskorte et al., 2007), and
also the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) when the face belongs
to a familiar person (Wagner et al., 2012).
The network of brain regions supporting mentalizing (theory of
mind) includes TPJ, MPFC, and superior temporal sulcus (STS).
STS is especially sensitive to biological motion (Vaina et al.,
2001) and has also been associated with joint social attention
(Nummenmaa and Calder, 2009), where eye gaze, as an impor-
tant social cue, indicates the focus of one’s attention. Recently,
human STS was shown to contain both broadly tuned regions
and more narrowly tuned subregions, each responsive to a sub-
set of social information (Deen et al., 2015). Altogether, STS re-
sponds to a wide range of social stimuli, and it hence can be
considered as a ‘‘hub’’ for social perception (Lahnakoski et al.,
2012).
TPJ and MPFC seem to have complementary roles in inferring
others’ mental states: TPJ has been associated with inferring
temporary states of others (e.g., goals and intentions), whereas
MPFC has been associated with inferring more enduring states
(permanent characteristics, self-relevance) and self-knowledge
(for a review, see Van Overwalle, 2009). MPFC comprises func-
tional subregions involved in either more cognitive or more
emotional tasks (Amodio and Frith, 2006).All these circuitries work in close connection with other brain
areas and networks that support social cognition (see e.g., Frith,
2007). For example, amygdala and temporal pole are considered
important for social scripts, emotions, and judgments. The
medial prefrontal cortex and midline structures in general are
related to self-referential processing (Northoff and Bermpohl,
2004). Moreover, several brain areas—including sensorimotor
cortices—support shared sensorimotor representations for self
and others. Important is also, e.g., striatum as a brain region
related to reward learning, as well as the prefrontal cortex that
controls meta-cognition and higher-order thinking (Frith and
Frith, 2012).
Several other networks have a role in social cognition. For
example, the salience network (with nodes in anterior cingulate
cortex and anterior insulae of both hemispheres) is assumed to
recruit other brain regions to process sensory stimuli, and the vi-
sual dorsal attention network (parietal cortex, frontal eye fields,
visual cortices) is central in all kinds of voluntary attention
(Barrett and Satpute, 2013). In addition, a separate network
has been suggested for empathy, including the anterior insula
and dorsal-anterior/anterior-midcingulate cortex (Bernhardt
and Singer, 2012).
Despite the improving understanding of brain areas involved in
social cognition, the details of the neural representations and
especially the neural dynamics of the different parts of the net-
works are still poorly understood and require further experi-
mental and theoretical work. Moreover, the details of analysis
may determine whether one sees robust wide-spread networks
or their task-related division to subnetworks (Pamilo et al., 2012).
One promising framework for modeling various levels of brain
functions, including mirroring and mentalizing, is predictive cod-
ing, a Bayesian approach to perception, action, and various
cognitive functions (de Bruin and Strijbos, 2015; Kilner et al.,
2007; Koster-Hale and Saxe, 2013). Here the basic assumption
is that since the brain operates in uncertain conditions, it likely
has to maintain probabilistic models of the surrounding world,
updating them on the basis of sensory information.
The predictive coding works at several nested levels so that
higher-level cortical areas generate predictions of forthcoming
events for lower-level areas, and the error signals—informing
about discrepancies between the expected and received sen-
sory feedback—are evaluated to adjust the model in the
higher-level areas. Although these mechanisms were originally
considered for single person’s behavior, even including theory-
of-mind attributions (Koster-Hale and Saxe, 2013), they may be
extended to cover others’ mental states by inferring the states
of mind in which the observers themselves are. A generalized
synchrony emerges when an observer is modeling the behavior
of another person who is modeling the observer (Friston and
Frith, 2015).
Spectator Science?
Despite the enormous accumulation of important brain-imaging
data, it has to be noted that most approaches to investigate the
brain basis of social cognition and interaction have so far been
based on the assumption that humans (and their brains) are
reactive and that the baseline state of the reacting brain remains
about the same whatever stimuli are presented. In other words,Neuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 183
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Figure 1. Conceptual Differences between Spectator and Interactor
Brain-Imaging Settings
Left: the subject is a passive spectator and the stimulus–response effects are
unidirectional. Right: in a real-life situation (in setups of two-person neuro-
science), the subject to be studied is an engaged interactor, and the (closed-
loop) stimuli change according to both subjects’ reactions.
Box 1. Current Status of the Field
d Regularities of the external world and people, with their
characteristic spatiotemporal appearance, as part of our
environment, inevitably leave their traces into our brains.
d Nervous systems have developed for guiding movements
and for prediction of future events, with a special sensitivity
to social stimuli.
d Bodies are strongly involved in cognition and emotions,
and both brain and bodily functions are synchronized
by external events, especially when the events are
emotionally laden.
d Two-person neuroscience (2PN) is an approach to study
two interacting persons at the same time, with a focus on
the dyad rather than the individuals. Recent technical ad-
vances in 2PN brain imaging include setups that enable
simultaneous scanning of two subjects in the same fMRI
scanner, simultaneous imaging using two connected
MEG scanners, as well as simultaneous EEG and NIRS
recordings.
d If the social interaction unfolds in tens of milliseconds, as
does, e.g., face-to-face interaction, 2PN brain imaging
setups are needed to capture the essential features of the
related brain functions, whereas brain mechanisms of
slowly paced (seconds or slower) interaction, such as writ-
ten communication, can be reduced to sequential brain im-
aging of the participants (Figure 2).
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behavior are largely neglected.
This kind of research comprises most of the current brain im-
aging literature and can be considered to represent ‘‘spectator
science.’’ Yet, during naturalistic social interactions, the baseline
brain state of the examined person changes the more engaging
the stimuli are (Figure 1). In other words, people are participating
in the events of their world, and they do not only serve as passive
observers as is implicitly assumed in most of the current brain-
imaging experiments.
Interactive Approaches into Social Neuroscience
While discussing research of social interaction as part of social
neuroscience, Stanley and Adolphs (Stanley and Adolphs,
2013) called it ‘‘.an unusually rich and interesting topic,
exactly what social psychologists would wish to study and
many neurobiologists think is too fuzzy to study.’’ Conse-
quently, they list social interaction as a topic of future social
neuroscience and suggest that real social interactions should
be studied in well-controlled animal models. While fully
acknowledging the challenges and possible caveats involved
in uncontrolled, natural social experiments, we believe that so-
cial interaction has such a profound impact on our brain func-
tions that it can no longer be ignored in experimental human
neuroscience (see Box 1).184 Neuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.Consequently, we have proposed ‘‘two-person neuroscience’’
(2PN) as a suitable conceptual andmethodological framework to
study the physiological basis of human social interaction (Hari
and Kujala, 2009). 2PN refers to an approach to study two inter-
acting persons at the same time, and the related conceptual
framework, with a focus on dyads rather than individuals. Of spe-
cial interest is the emerging smooth and rapid social interaction
(see Item 5 below). Our definition of 2PN allows the subjects
under study to take the first-person, second-person, or third-
person perspective according to the task demands. Thus, the
2PN approach is a more general (and may bemore methodolog-
ically oriented) than second-person neuroscience (Schilbach,
2015; Schilbach et al., 2013). However, both concepts empha-
size the importance of active participation so that the persons
under study are not just observers of social situations. Both
these approaches will hopefully promote studies on real social
interaction in which the reactions of one subject are the stimuli
for the other subject, and vice versa.
Studies of the brain basis of social interaction would benefit
from, or even require, more naturalistic stimuli and setups than
are currently used in most imaging laboratories. Ultimately, one
would like to study people who are in real social interaction.
Next, we lay out five steps on this road from usingwell-controlled
artificial stimuli to truly interactive social experiments. In Figure 2,
Items 1–5 refer to the corresponding subsections below.
(1) Well-Controlled, Artificial Stimuli
Most of our knowledge about human brain function has been
achieved using simple andwell-controlled stimuli, such as check-
erboards with different check sizes, contrasts and luminance, or
Figure 2. Examples of Brain Imaging Setups
(1)–(3) are single-person setups, (4) can be studied either in a single-person
setup (studying the members of the dyad sequentially) or in a 2PN setup,
(5) requires a 2PN setup. (1) Subject receives simplified but well-controlled
sensory stimuli. (2) Subject receives static pictures of social stimuli, e.g., faces.
(3) Subject receives dynamical stimuli, e.g., movies or, for mirroring studies,
live actions. (4) Two persons are interacting, e.g., in an economic game or by
writing. Here the time lags between the two subjects’ interactive actions or
responses are long. (5) Two persons are engaged in true, real-time social
interaction, such as conversation. The interaction is dynamic and the re-
sponses and alignment can overlap in time.
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and presentation sequences, or somatosensory stimuli applied
as electric pulses to peripheral nerves or as touch on the skin. In
traditional experimental neuroscience, such accurately defined
stimuli and well-controlled experimental setups have provided
invaluable information about the transfer functions of all sensory
systems from peripheral sensory receptors to sensory cortices,
as well as—in tasks requiring motor actions—from the brain to
the periphery. The tradition has been to build on the responses
to elementary stimuli to address the functional principles underly-
ing the processing of more complex stimuli, which has been, and
still continues to be, an efficient approach in sensory neurosci-
ence (Rust and Movshon, 2005). Yet, when it comes to under-
standing how the dynamic social environment is processed in
the brain, this approach—even when complemented with effi-
cient computational approaches—may miss some essential in-
gredients of the complex interactive social processing.
(2) Snapshots of Complex, Naturalistic Stimuli
Presentation of more complex stimuli allows studying how hu-
mans react to, e.g., faces of other humans. Even though the brain
is extremely sensitive to faces, presenting a still image of a face
already introduces a challenge for modeling the brain activity
starting from, e.g., single-unit responses to low-level visual ele-
ments comprising spatial frequencies, orientations, contrasts,
and luminance. Comparing responses to different complex stim-
uli has revealed functionally specialized brain regions (Kanw-
isher, 2010), including the fusiform face area, which responds
strongly to faces as explained above. However, only a very
limited number of stimuli of particular perceptual significance
can be expected to show such functional specialization, and
most tasks engage distributed brain networks without any ofthe nodes necessarily showing functional specialization for the
task or stimulus at hand.
(3) Dynamic Stimuli
The next step is to incorporate motion to the stimuli to make
them more natural. Motion, vividness, and action—either a live
person or a video—in the experimental setup can help unravel
how humans react to actions and intentions of other people.
Moving stimuli are highly engaging, both perceptually and at
neural level, as can be inferred from the robust brain activations
that they elicit. For example, several areas of the face-process-
ing circuitry are activated more effectively by video clips of natu-
rally moving faces than by still pictures of faces (Schultz and Pilz,
2009). Moreover, the human STS is known to be very sensitive to
biological motion (Blake and Shiffrar, 2007). Motor actions, either
live or on video, continue to serve as essential dynamic stimuli in
action observation studies designed to explore mirroring mech-
anisms of the human brain.
Movies, in general, provide an effective means to study both
low-level sensory processes and social cognition. Cinema is
an extremely rich visual (and often multimodal) stimulus but still
well controlled as it can be repeated in an identical form to the
same subject or to a group of subjects. It thereby serves as a
staging post on the route toward real naturalistic setups. A
well-directed movie stimulates and engages the human mind,
and it also includes the unique ability to manipulate space and
time, as well as to create an illusion of intimacy by showing
close-ups of faces. Although people just view the movie, without
interaction, they easily identify themselves with the protagonists
and capture emotions from film episodes in a strikingly similar
manner (Nummenmaa et al., 2012).
(4) Two Persons in Slowly Paced Social Interaction
When progressing beyond the single-person setups in studies
even in naturalistic environments, the next step is to search for
brain correlates of social interaction. Methodologically, and
probably also conceptually, the easiest way may be to start
from temporally clearly separate brain signals from persons
who are engaged in relatively slowly paced social interaction,
such as sending and receiving text messages. This type of
communication can be characterized as reactive rather than
interactive, meaning that the receiver reacts to the most recent
output of the partner instead of forming a dynamically adapting
dyad with her. Although we are dealing here with a real social
interaction, either embodied or disembodied, we do not neces-
sarily need simultaneous recordings from the two subjects. We
can, for example, record the brain signals separately from the
sender and receiver of writtenmessages, keeping the interacting
person outside the scanner, and then swapping the roles. Other
suitable experimental paradigms are, e.g., economical decision
games (Tomlin et al., 2006).
(5) Two Persons in Dynamic, Embodied Interaction
True social interaction occurs at a fast pace and the responses
can overlap in time. Examples include the very quick turn-taking
during conversation and the unconscious mutual adaptation
during a joint motor task, such as carrying a big heavy object.
Simultaneous brain imaging from both interacting subjects is
required to capture the full picture of the real-time (embodied)
interaction; such dynamic interaction cannot be reduced from
2PN settings to sequential one-person measurements.Neuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 185
Box 2. Future Directions
d Development of more real-life-like 2PN setups that employ
novel measurement technologies and analysis methods to
track at the same time both brain and bodily functions,
including movement synchrony.
d Development of experiments and analysis methods to test
whether, and how, the interactive versus reactive modes of
brain function differ.
d Characterization of the different timings of the mentalizing
and mirroring systems and their relationships to the dy-
namics of other brain networks subserving social cognition
and interaction.
d Further topics to be studied in 2PN settings include the
following:
o Brain basis of the synchrony and turn-taking of motor
actions, vocal expressions, and gestures during nat-
ural interaction
o The effect of presence of another person on resting-
state and task-related activity, and the mutual adap-
tation of these effects in both persons
o Brain correlates of feeling of togetherness during
smooth fast-spaced interaction
o Emotional contagion (between the participants, and
from an external source but experienced together
with the other participant in a situation similar to
viewing a movie or listening to a political speech
together)
o Social error monitoring (entailing predictions and
their violations to inform of the neural systems sup-
porting social interaction)
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when a 2PN setup is the most efficient and informative, or the
only possibility. For example, investigating the neural basis of
natural face-to-face interaction likely calls for 2PN approaches,
whereas monitoring brain activity during an exchange of written
messages can well be studied sequentially (see Item 4 above).
Some estimates of the relevant timescales calling for 2PN setups
arise from the speed of articulation movements and other
dynamical facial changes, such as eye blinks (Mandel et al.,
2015), to which we react either consciously or unconsciously
during face-to-face communication. For example, since a
phoneme typically lasts about 100 ms, the sampling of the brain
signals should take place at least at 50-ms intervals, corre-
sponding to about 20 Hz. Thus, time-resolved brain-imaging
methods, such as MEG or EEG, are needed to track the under-
lying brain activity in such experiments.
Finally, it is important to note that these rapid-paced interac-
tions needing 2PN-imaging setups can never be repeated (in
contrast to many slow interactions in Item 4), because they are
specific to that particular time and interaction.
Simultaneous Neuroimaging of Two or More Subjects
Natural social interaction comprises unique spatiotemporal
events whose exact content and timing are usually unpredict-
able; the same interaction sequence cannot be repeated to sepa-186 Neuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.rately record the brain activity of the other interactor. Hence, if we
only have data from one interactor, it would be necessary to
quantify the interaction to identify the brain processes supporting
it. This quantification is challenging since itmay necessitate high-
level interpretations of the behavior; for example, the analysis
may involve a continuous assessment of the mentalizing per-
formed by the other participant. In contrast, when data are avail-
able from both brains, we can seek for dependencies between
the two sets of brain signals, without explicit reference to the
external events, to reveal brain processes that support the inter-
action. Thereafter, we can aim at building models that capture
and predict the coupling between the brain signals and behavior,
both within and between the interacting subjects (see Box 2 for
suggestions of topics to be resolved using 2PN setups).
However, care must be exercised in the design, analysis, and
interpretation of such experiments: trivial correlations between
the participants’ brains can emerge simply due to low-level sen-
sory input reaching both subjects. Therefore, one should include
appropriate control conditions (e.g., passive observation) and
employ suitable analytical approaches that help tease apart
the contributions due to mere shared sensory input.
Simultaneous brain imaging of multiple subjects is commonly
referred to as hyperscanning or dual scanning. The technical
feasibility of hyperscanning has already been demonstrated
using a variety of different brain imaging methods (see e.g.,
Babiloni and Astolfi, 2014). In the following, we concisely review
some hyperscanning studies.
fMRI-to-fMRI: From Connected Scanners to Dual-Coil
Experiments
Montague et al. (Montague et al., 2002) were the first to record
brain signals from two persons at the same time: the subjects
were located in different 1.5 T fMRI scanners situated over
1,000 miles apart and connected via the Internet. During the
scanning, the subjects played a simple interactive game where
the receiver subject needed to guess whether the color (two
options) mediated by the sender was the same as what the
sender had seen on her screen. The receiver won the game if
she guessed right, otherwise the sender won. Data were
analyzed using both temporal regressors and independent
component analysis (ICA) by concatenating the data from two
brains into a single ‘‘hyperbrain.’’ Results showed between-sub-
ject similarity in the supplementary motor area, and the signals
from both brains had the same task-related frequency of about
0.04 Hz, with slightly different phases. This study demonstrated
the feasibility of dual-fMRI scanning and introduced the idea that
social interaction could be best understood by simultaneously
scanning the brains of both interacting persons.
Subsequent two-person fMRI experiments have revealed
changes in brain activity related to, e.g., reciprocity (King-Casas
et al., 2005), agency (Tomlin et al., 2006), and social comparison
on reward processing (Fliessbach et al., 2007). Recently, two-
person fMRI was applied to study information flow between
two brains during a joint attention paradigm applied with an im-
mersive audiovisual interface between the two scanners (Bilek
et al., 2015). Noteworthy is that simultaneous measurements
from both brains are not always necessary in communicative
tasks (Figure 2, Item 4), but the brain activity of the two players
can be recorded sequentially.
Neuron
PerspectiveIn most published two-person fMRI studies, twoMRI scanners
have been connected via the Internet. The latest setups enable
scanning two people simultaneously even in the same MRI de-
vice. Currently, we are aware of three technical realizations for
two-person recordings in one fMRI scanner with dual-head bird-
cage coils. A setup with subjects laying side-by-side in the scan-
ner became operational first at Princeton University, USA (Lee,
2015; Lee et al., 2010, 2012). The first two-person fMRI setup
in our laboratory at Aalto University, Finland was a pair of
helmet-like surface coils with which the subjects were imaged
in a face-to-face position while they were lying on their stomach,
with upper bodies tilted slightly upward so that the first subject
entered the scanner feet first and the other in the normal manner
head first (V. Renvall and S. Malinen, 2012, OHBM, conference);
for a video of the setup, see https://vimeo.com/98542820.
Because of neck strain in the applied position, our laboratory’s
latest setup also allows the two people to be lying on their sides
in face-to-face position, thus being able to, e.g., touch each
other’s faces (V. Renvall, J. Kaurama¨ki, S. Malinen, R. Hari,
and L. Nummenmaa, 2015, Soc. Neurosci., conference). Prelim-
inary studies with these pioneering two-person fMRI setups have
confirmed that it is technically possible to record fMRI signals
simultaneously from two subjects within the same scanner.
Thebenefitsofdual-coil setups for two-person fMRIareobvious
for real 2PN recordings because the dyad can interactwithout any
delay, the presence of the other is very strong, the signal quality in
the same scanner is the same for both persons, and there are no
delays in data acquisition from the two brains. However, in the
side-by-side implementations (Leeet al., 2010; V.Renvall, J.Kaur-
ama¨ki, S. Malinen, R. Hari, and L. Nummenmaa, 2015, Soc. Neu-
rosci., conference), the distance between the bodies of the two
participants may be too intimate for natural interaction, at least
for strangers. Without vision correction, the focusing distance to
the other person’s face may also be too short, and in our current
setup (V. Renvall, J. Kaurama¨ki, S. Malinen, R. Hari, and L. Num-
menmaa, 2015, Soc. Neurosci., conference) the coils are so
snug that one cannot wear headphones. It is thus obvious that
further technical development is eagerly awaited for in this area.
fNIRS-to-fNIRS
Functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) has also been
applied to study brain activity simultaneously from multiple sub-
jects. Themain benefit of fNIRS comparedwith fMRI is the porta-
bility of the equipment, enabling more naturalistic experimental
setups. In the first two-person fNIRS experiment, the subjects
performed a cooperative button-press task while sitting face-
to-face across a table (Funane et al., 2011). Subsequently, fNIRS
hyperscanning has been applied, for example, to study the
uniqueness of face-to-face communication (Jiang et al., 2012)
and the emergence of a leader during communication (Jiang
et al., 2015). The recent introduction of a wearable multi-channel
fNIRS system (Piper et al., 2014) opens a possibility of simulta-
neous brain imaging from freely moving interacting subjects.
However, fNIRS is limited by the poor penetration of light through
the scalp, skull, and brain tissue, so that one can only assess the
superficial brain structures. Compared with other brain imaging
techniques, fNIRS has a relatively low spatial resolution and its
temporal resolution is limited by the inherent sluggishness of
the underlying hemodynamic phenomena, similarly as in fMRI.EEG-to-EEG
The first dual-EEG data were recorded already 50 years ago in
a bizarre study designed to explore extrasensory perception
(Duane and Behrendt, 1965), but more serious EEG hyperscan-
ning has gained popularity during the last decade (Astolfi et al.,
2010; Babiloni and Astolfi, 2014; Babiloni et al., 2007a, 2007b).
The benefits of EEG include high temporal resolution, relatively
low cost, and high portability, enabling naturalistic experimental
setupsandsimultaneousmeasurements frommore than twosub-
jects. Consequently, EEG hyperscanning has been applied to
study the brain basis of people’s tendency to mutually adapt to
each other’s rhythm during motor tasks (see, e.g., Dumas et al.,
2010; Konvalinka et al., 2014) and speech (Kawasaki et al., 2013).
Music and especially playing in musical ensembles provides
an interesting setting to study social interaction as the synchrony
between players can be monitored behaviorally at many levels
(D’Ausilio et al., 2015). The coordination of actions during
music performance has also been studied using simultaneous
EEG recordings, suggesting, for example, brain signatures for
emotional empathy and musical roles during the performance
(see, for example, Babiloni et al., 2012; Lindenberger et al.,
2009; Mu¨ller et al., 2013).
During EEG-to-EEG recordings, the participants can move
quite freely (although movement artifacts easily arise). The ca-
veats of EEG include poor discrimination of different signal sour-
ces, even those of the most prominent brain rhythms. Many EEG
hyperscanning studies have reported brain-to-brain synchrony
at single frequencies, such as around the 20-Hz beta oscilla-
tions, raising questions about the origin of the modulation taken
that brain rhythms have clear individual signatures in frequencies
and modulations. Moreover, most brain rhythms have several
sources, the dominance of which changes with a short (a few
hundredmillisecond) timescale (Salmelin and Hari, 1994). A safer
approach would be to look at the modulations of the envelopes
of the rhythms but here the problem is their slowness so that
although the electrophysiological signals as such have milli-
second temporal resolution, the rhythms wax and wane with a
time constant slower than a few hundred milliseconds (Ramku-
mar et al., 2010).
MEG-to-MEG
We realized the first simultaneous MEG-to-MEG recordings be-
tween two MEG labs 5 km apart (Baess et al., 2012). In these
initial recordings, the subjects interacted through a short-latency
audio connection. More recently, we augmented the two-MEG
setup to include also a video connection between the partici-
pants and implemented the audiovisual link via the Internet,
allowing MEG hyperscanning of participants at arbitrarily large
geographical distances. The setup delivers video with an end-
to-end delay of about 130 ms, which does not hamper smooth
and natural interaction (Zhdanov et al., 2015). In Japan, a
setup with two MEG scanners in the same room was recently
established and its feasibility was demonstrated by studying
simultaneously a mother and her child who were lying on their
backs in scanners located side-by-side, seeing each other’s
facial expressions in real time via a mirror system (Hirata et al.,
2014).
Although connecting two MEG devices is more complex and
expensive than using a dual-EEG system, the unique benefitsNeuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 187
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high temporal resolution as EEG, it offers significantly better
spatial resolution since the neuromagnetic fields, unlike the
EEG signals, are not smeared by the combination of the poorly
conducting skull and the well-conducting cerebrospinal fluid
and scalp (Ha¨ma¨la¨inen et al., 1993; Hari and Parkkonen, 2015;
Hari and Salmelin, 2012). The better spatial resolution of MEG
not only enables more precise localization of the neural activity
but, perhaps more importantly here, better separability of simul-
taneously active brain regions, especially those generating brain
rhythms that are often recorded in studies of social interaction (for
a recent reviewof theMEGmethod, seeHari andSalmelin, 2012).
Compared with EEG, however, MEG ismost sensitive to activ-
ity in the fissural cortex and typically does not pick up signals
from deep brain regions. In addition, asynchronous neural activ-
ity is poorly represented in both MEG and EEG, which makes
MEG/EEG less sensitive than fMRI to activity, which is not accu-
rately time locked to external events.
The Challenge of Interpreting 2PN Data
Now that simultaneous brain imaging of multiple subjects has
become technically feasible, we should turn our attention to
the analysis of the recordings. In general, a major concern in
the interpretation of hyperscanning data is the inability to disen-
tangle the correlations evoked by social interaction from other
possible common sources between the subjects. A synchronous
change in the data from two subjects does not necessarily imply
coupling related to the social interaction but can reflect, for
example, a difference in the experimental conditions affecting
both subjects (Burgess, 2013). In addition, synchronous
changes in physiological (cardiac and respiratory) signals during
behavioral synchrony (Mu¨ller and Lindenberger, 2011) could also
manifest as spurious correlations between the two subjects’
neuroimaging data. As discussed in the preceding sections,
identifying the true brain signatures of social interaction from
two-person data remains a grand challenge for future 2PN
research.
Social interaction involves a plethora of brain processes that
work at multiple temporal scales, related to monitoring of past
behavior, reacting to current sensory input, and predicting the
actions of the partner. Intersubject synchrony and alignment
can take place at all these levels. The analysis methods of the
corresponding brain signals should thus be able to tackle all
this complexity.
Repeated joint actions, such as synchronized movements,
likely appear as temporal correlations in brain signals. In
contrast, e.g., conversation should also involve reciprocal or
‘‘antagonistic’’ brain activations due to the dynamic asymmetry
between the speaker and the listener. Moreover, the mere pres-
ence of another person likely influences brain responses to stim-
uli or tasks that are not even related to the other. Disentangling
these different sources of modulations of brain activity forms a
challenge for both data analysis and experimental design.
Since brain measurements have traditionally been confined to
single subjects, appropriate and established analysis methods
for hyperscanning data are not readily available. Currently known
analytic approaches to 2PN data could be broadly categorized
as follows.188 Neuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.(1) Hyperconnectivity
Functional connectivity refers to detecting temporal correlations
in signals from different brain regions and considering those to
reflect couplings of, or common drive to, these regions. In 2PN
studies, this approach can be extended to the signals measured
simultaneously from the brains of both participants. The hyper-
connectivity (Astolfi et al., 2011) analysis aims to detect how
the brain of each participant in a dyad influences the brain of
the other and how joint behavior may mediate interbrain func-
tional coupling.
Functional hyperconnectivity between two brains can be as-
sessed between (1) homologous areas in brain 1 and brain 2,
(2) between one area in brain 1 and all areas in brain 2, and (3)
between networks of areas in brain 1 and brain 2. The methodo-
logical and computational challenges as well as difficulties in
visualizing and interpreting the results naturally increase when
moving from (1) to (3).
Hyperconnectivity analysis has been performed on EEG data,
e.g., by assessing phase synchronization across the signals from
subject pairs who were playing guitar together (Lindenberger
et al., 2009), by quantifying Granger causality when subjects
were playing a card game (Astolfi et al., 2010), and by computing
phase-locking values while subjects were imitating each other’s
hand movements (Dumas et al., 2012).
Despite the success in applying connectivity metrics originally
developed for within-brain analysis, real social interaction is pre-
sumably associated with more complex dependencies between
the brain signals. For example, each subject may be constantly
switching between active, reactive, and anticipatory modes in
the course of the interaction, which affects the relative timing
of the recorded signals. During interaction and joint tasks,
leader–follower relationships may spontaneously emerge, but
with varying time lags between the partners, modulating the
timing of the task-related brain signals. Similarly, during a con-
versation, brains of the speaker and listener, in addition to
showing activations of overlapping brain areas (Stephens
et al., 2010), likely exhibit antagonistic behavior. Thus, an ideal
method for hyperconnectivity analysis should be able to esti-
mate not only brain-to-brain couplings but also allow mode-
dependent time lags and directions of these couplings. Along
these lines, we have proposed non-linear canonical correlation
analysis, with a dynamic delay between the signal sets, for the
analysis of dual-MEG signals (Campi et al., 2013). Very recently
Bilek and colleagues (Bilek et al., 2015) assessed hyperconnec-
tivity in a dual-fMRI experiment on joint attention by computing
cross-correlations of those independent components (deter-
mined jointly from all participants’ data) that showed more activ-
ity during interaction versus non-interaction; they also estimated
the delay between the two signal sets.
(2) Correlations with External Measures
Behavioral signals associated, e.g., with movements or speech
could help disentangle 2PN data. For example, computing corti-
covocal coherence between the fundamental frequency of the
acoustic signal from the speaker and the brain activity of the
listener (Bourguignon et al., 2013) could indicate which part of
the brain-to-brain coupling is due to the mere shared sensory
stimulus. In general, bodies are closely involved in cognition
and emotions (Nummenmaa et al., 2014a) and peripheral
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breathing rhythm, could index the dynamics and strength of
mutual coupling and thus alleviate the problems in isolated anal-
ysis of 2PN imaging data.
(3) Joint Statistics and Multivariate Pattern Analysis
Statistical methods addressing signals from both brains simul-
taneously, e.g., independent or principal component analysis
(ICA/PCA) performed at once on functional data from both
brains, could be used to search for functional networks from
the two instead of one brain. Such analysis is expected to
pool, e.g., the network involved in speech comprehension in
one brain with the speech production network in the other brain.
However, in real conversation, the participants do not merely
respond to the partner’s message they just heard but they are
aligned toward the partner and largely anticipate her/his next
lines. The brain processes supporting such predictions may
not follow the time course of turn taking and thus may not be
considered as components reflecting speaking and listening
even though these processes can be crucial for the social
aspect of the interaction. Therefore, approaches that aim at
forming predictions about the future (instead of present) signals
in brain 2 using data from brain 1 may turn successful in 2PN
analysis.
If the 2PN data are assumed to contain cross-brain correla-
tions during discrete temporal windows only, group factor anal-
ysis (probabilistic extension of canonical correlation analysis)
has been shown to provide a meaningful separation of the 2PN
data in indicating which of the persons is speaking at a given
time (Remes et al., 2013).
Multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA) methods, also known as
‘‘decoding’’ of brain signals, can also be applied to 2PN data.
Konvalinka and colleagues (Konvalinka et al., 2014) employed
such approaches to dual-EEG recordings to predict whether
the subjects were following mutual synchrony in finger tapping
or following a computer metronome. Selecting appropriate
features (evoked responses, amplitude envelopes of on-going
oscillations, etc.) from the 2PN analysis is crucial for success
in these approaches. As with hyperconnectivity measures of
brain-to-brain coupling (Burgess, 2013), a caveat with MVPA is
that successful ‘‘decoding’’ of brain responses may rely on brain
signals that are synchronous but not because of the interaction.
Hence, future studies should aim at building and estimating
computational encoding models (Naselaris et al., 2011) that
describe the coupling between the subjects to really ‘‘decode’’
the underlying brain signals.
Social Interaction: The Brain’s Default Mode?
Social interaction is among the most complex functions humans
(and their brains) perform. Yet, the interaction typically appears
surprisingly easy. For example, during conversation, turns of
speaking are usually taken effortlessly, smoothly, and in a
temporally accurate manner without conscious effort. According
to Garrod and Pickering (2004), humans are ‘‘designed’’ for dia-
logs rather than monologues. These authors consider conversa-
tion so easy because unconscious interactive processing aligns
the linguistic representations of the interlocutors so that the
cognitive load is alleviated as it can be divided on an ‘‘implicit
common ground.’’One behavioral feature that might facilitate social perception is
the innate tendency to see agency andmental states in inanimate
objects, even inmoving geometrical shapes (Heider and Simmel,
1944). Assuming the world to be animated and full of agents is
especially common in childhood; in adulthood, active inhibition
of the attribution of agency seems to be required for rational infer-
ences about events in the world (Lindeman et al., 2013).
Would it then be possible that humans have an innate ten-
dency to interact and synchronize with others? The origin of
such a tendency would be easy to understand in all mammals
who are entrained with the mother’s motor and vocalization
rhythm already in the womb. Moreover, because of their imma-
turity, the human newborns have to totally rely on their care-
givers. Being in synchrony seems to please the caregiver and
result in better care. Preference for synchronous movements
with others continues throughout the adult life.
The primacy of interaction is also supported by findings that
children learn best during interaction, and much less by
observing the behaviors of others (Moll and Meltzoff, 2011).
Moreover, it is inherent for small children to assume shared
perceptual experience even when there is none (Moll and Meltz-
off, 2011). These experimental findings agree with view that, ‘‘In-
fant human beings imitate other humans, not just to act like them,
but to enter into a communicative and cooperative relationship
with them by some transfer of the feeling of body action’’ (Tre-
varthen, 2011).
In an innovative behavioral study, Noy et al. (Noy et al., 2011)
asked dyads of subjects to play a one-dimensional mirror game
in which the players, placed on two sides of a narrow table,
moved their own handle along a track either in a leader–follower
fashion or without any designated leader being just instructed to
‘‘imitate each other, create interesting and synchronized move-
ments and enjoy playing together.’’ Analysis of the velocity pat-
terns showed closer similarity between the two players in the
latter condition, indicating that the players had entered co-lead-
ership states during which the synchrony of behavior was much
better than in the leader–follower conditions. One sees here a
close resemblance to various joint tasks, with continuous
smooth adaptation to other persons’ actions without any of the
participants working consciously as leaders or followers. In gen-
eral, interpersonal synchrony is considered to promote social
connectedness, and in improvisation theater such connected-
ness is specifically trained.
Two more recent studies focused on the feelings of ‘‘together-
ness’’ during improvisedmotion, a phenomenon familiar tomany
dancers, musicians, and actors acting in synchrony (Hart et al.,
2014; Noy et al., 2015). Hart et al. (Hart et al., 2014) noticed
that although individuals have their characteristic signatures of
velocity patterns in the mirror game (that they use while acting
as leaders), during the togetherness epochs these movement
patterns were different; they were not of either of the partici-
pants, nor were they just average or intermediate patterns but
distinctly different from the individual patterns. It is thus likely
that during joint actions the participants construct their complex
movements from simpler and smoother elements that are easier
for the other to follow.
Furthermore, Noy et al. (Noy et al., 2015), using the same
game, noticed that during the moments of togetherness, orNeuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 189
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ing period and were assessed by subjective ratings and by kine-
matics of the players—were characterized by increased heart
rates regardless of motion intensity. Such a pattern was seen
for subjectively defined periods of togetherness but clearly less
so for the kinematically defined epochs of togetherness. The au-
thors suggested a connection of the participants’ heart rates to
enhanced engagement and enjoyment during the epochs of
togetherness.
In good agreement with these experimental findings is the
‘‘Interactive Brain Hypothesis’’ (IBH) of Di Paolo and De
Jaegher (Di Paolo and De Jaegher, 2012). IBH assumes that
interactive experience and interactive skills play an enabling
role for the development and function of social brain functions
in an analogous manner as, e.g., electricity has an enabling
role in boiling water in a kettle. If IBH would turn out to be
true, we would need to revise many current ideas about the
brain basis of human social interaction. This is because social
interaction is at present considered to emerge from simple
perceptual and cognitive mechanisms that should be explored
using well-controlled stimuli before moving towards more
naturalistic experiments, in a way resembling the evolution of
brain-imaging setups in Figure 2. Stated boldly, the assump-
tions of IBH would form the big picture of interactive behavior,
decorated by all the details of perception and action, and not
vice versa.
Social interaction as the default mode of human brain would
also have profound implications for the large-scale research ini-
tiatives aiming to simulate functions of the human brain. If the
goal is to achieve human-like behavior, it is not enough to build
on the bottom-up stimulus-driven effects, but the centrality,
eventually primacy, of social interaction should be incorporated
to the models.
The principles of human brain function are to some extent
simulated and tested in social robotics that aims at building ro-
bots with human-like social skills (for a review, see Scassellati
et al., 2012), such as abilities to recognize faces, follow eye
gaze, and react to gestures and other social signals. However,
social robots are, at least so far, built to mimic and recognize hu-
man behavior, not to simulate human brain functions.
For smooth human-robot interaction, the robot does not
necessarily need to appear human-like (humanoid), and too real-
istic external features can even make the humans to feel the
robot ‘‘uncanny’’ (Mori, 1982). Desirable properties of future so-
cial robots could include the adaptive dynamics of smooth social
interaction. Even a very simple robot can be highly engaging and
evoke, especially in children, an urge to attribute mental states to
that nonliving apparatus. Preliminary studies suggest that social
robots could be used in education to provide peer support for
children, e.g., in language learning (Kanda et al., 2004), or in
behavioral therapy to encourage autistic children to develop
and employ social skills (Scassellati et al., 2012).
In our mind, the future of social neuroscience should aim at
both conceptual andmethodological advances in understanding
the brain basis of social interaction, targeting questions such as
how to transfer the obtained information about the centrality of
social interaction into simulating of human brain function, how
to build socially smart interactive robots, and how to better un-190 Neuron 88, October 7, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.derstand and eventually treat social dysfunction in various
neurological and psychiatric disorders.
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